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EVIDENCE-ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP-CLIENT'S IDENTITY PRIVILEGED
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in In re Grand
Jury Proceedings' held that a client's identity, fee and bonding arrangements may be privileged from disclosure by his attorney to the grand jury
when such protection is necessary to preserve the client's privileged motive.'
The appellants, all duly-licensed Texas attorneys, were served with subpoenas commanding them to appear and testify before the grand jury, and
to produce the records of fees believed to have been paid by undisclosed
parties, who the appellants claimed to represent in a professional capacity
on behalf of specified named clients.3 The Government sought the identities of these undisclosed clients in order to corroborate and supplement
existing information connecting them with possible income tax violations.
The Government suspected that the alleged payment of fees to these attorneys was far in excess of their clients' reported income for the year in
question.
The appellants filed motions to quash the subpoenas, asserting that
compulsion of their testimony as to the identities of the individuals who
retained them and paid their fees would requice disclosure of privileged
communications.' The motion to quash was denied and the appellants
appeared before the grand jury, but refused to answer the questions relating to the fees and identities of the third parties, asserting the claimed
privilege of an unidentified client. Following another hearing in which the
appellants again refused to testify, the district court cited the attorneys for
contempt 5 and they appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
The attorney-client privilege is essentially a right which belongs to the
client to prevent disclosure of confidential information which the individual has communicated in seeking professional advice.' The ultimate aim
of the privilege is protecting such communications from compelled disclosure by the attorney, and thus promoting freedom of consultation between
legal advisers and clients.7 Less apprehension of compelled disclosure of
1. 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975).
2. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2313, at 630 (McNaughton, 1961), wherein it is stated: "A
communication as to . . . the ultimate motive of the litigation, is equally protected with
others ..
"
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7602 is the basic authority for Internal Revenue Service
investigations, including the conferring of jurisdiction upon federal courts to enforce summons and subpoenas.
4. 517 F.2d at 669.
5. See Recalcitrant Witnesses, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1826 (Supp. 1976).
6. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton, 1961) surveys the history of this, the oldest
of the common-law privileges.

7. See Note, CaliforniaLaw as to Scope of Attorney-Client Privilege Held Applicable in
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confidential communications leads to more candid and useful information
to the lawyer, and assures adequate representation of the client. Freedom
of consultation, as a fundamental policy consideration underlying the privilege, however, necessarily conflicts with the countervailing policy of full
disclosure of all relevant evidence which is also one of the fundamental
policies of the law of evidence.' Thus, it is quite apparent that the application of the privilege, founded primarily upon public policy considerations,
is subject to the limitations and restraints imposed by public interest in
full disclosure.
Although none of the circuits has established a clear standard for determining the scope of the attorney-client privilege,' a general rule is discernible against any privilege as applied to the identity of the client, 0 or to the
receipt of fees." In most ordinary cases, the retention of counsel and the
payment of fees is not confidential and the client's identity presents no
problem." These acts rarely have any relationship to private professional
communications involving the rendering of legal advice and, thus, the
identity of an undisclosed client normally is not the proper subject matter
for a confidential communication." The general rule is also supported by
the fact that the policy of full disclosure is believed to be fundamental in
our legal system, and consequently the privilege is narrowly construed. 4
Perhaps the leading federal case following the general rule in holding
that the identity of the client is not generally within the privilege is United
States v. Pape.5 It involved a prosecution under the White Slave Traffic
Federal Non-Diversity Proceeding, 49 CAUF. L. REV. 382 (1961). See also 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE 2291 (McNaughton, 1961).
8. See, e.g., 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291, at 554 (McNaughton, 1961), wherein he discusses the speculative benefits of the privilege as opposed to its concrete obstruction to the
investigation of truth: "Nevertheless, the privilege remains an exception to the general duty
to disclose ....
It ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle." See also United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280 (6th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976, 84 S. Ct. 1883, 12 L.Ed. 2d 746 (1964).
9. FED. R. EVID. 501 authorizes the circuits to use a federal common law of criminal
evidence rather than state law in all criminal cases involving the attorney-client privilege.
10. See Frank v. Tomlinson, 351 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028, 86
S. Ct. 648, 15 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1966); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 951, 83 S. Ct. 505, 9 L. Ed. 2d 499 (1963); United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d
778 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 752, 65 S. Ct. 86, 89 L.Ed. 602 (1944).
11. United States v. Finley, 434 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1970). See also 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2292 (McNaughton, 1961) for a good summary enumerating the elements comprising the
scope of the privilege.
12. Behrens v. Hironimus, 170 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1948).
13. See, e.g., Banks v. United States, 204 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1953); McFee v. United
States, 206 F. 2d 872 (9th Cir. 1953). For a glimpse at various rationales advanced in support
of the general rules, see MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 90 (2d ed. 1972).
14. See In re Richardson, 31 N.J. 391, 157 A. 2d 695 (1960). See also WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2292 (McNaughton 1961).
15. 144 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 752, 65 S.Ct. 86, 89 L.Ed. 602 (1944).
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Act.'" There, an attorney was compelled to testify that the defendant had
retained him to defend, against a prostitution charge, a woman whom the
defendant was accused of transporting. The court followed the general
rule, holding that the fact of retainer or identity of the client was not within
the privilege, while nevertheless recognizing that "there may be situations
in which so much has already appeared of the actual communications...
that the disclosure of the client will result in a breach of the privilege."' 8
The Pape decision was obviously the result of a court straining to give
condplete deference to the "more general and pervasive rule of free disclosure to ascertain the truth and prevent the guilty from escaping. . . .
An examination of recent cases discloses increasing recognition that situations giving rise to an exception may exist.20 In the absence of any definitive rule of law in this area, these cases, necessarily, have been resolved
only after consideration of the particular factual circumstances which gave
rise to the controversy2 ' and upon weighing the conflicting policy considerations."2 Following this procedure, courts have shown less reluctance to
deviate from the general rule and more concern for protecting the client's
identity if disclosure would seriously inhibit freedom of consultation-a
fundamental policy consideration upon which the privilege is based. 2 The
argument for witholding the privilege loses its force in circumstances where
so much of the confidential communications has already been revealed
that disclosure of the client's identity would be tantamount to making
disclosure of his confidential communications.2" The undermining effect
upon the privilege becomes even more pronounced where "disclosure of the
identity of the client would have the effect of circumventing the client's
privilege against self-incrimination." 5
The most significant federal decision holding that the identification of
a client is privileged is Baird v. Koerner.21 There, a client, dilatory in his
16. 18 U.S.C.A. § 398 (1910), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2421-24 (Rev. 1949).
17. "[Tlhat it was an important step in connecting him with the woman's prostitution,
admits of no debate." 144 F.2d at 783-84 (Hand, L., dissenting).
18. Id. at 783.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1974); In Re Semel, 411
F.2d 195 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied ,396 U.S. 905 (1969).
21. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2313 at 608 (McNaughton, 1961) provides: "There is not entire
harmony in the ruling, but no doubt much ought to depend upon the circumstances of each
case." See also Note, Evidence-Attorney-Client Privilege-Identity of Client, 46 IOWA L.
REV. 904 (1961).
22. See Mauch v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1940).
23. See NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965); In Re Kaplan, 8 N.Y. 2d 214, 168
N.E. 2d 660 (1960); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960). See also Note, Assertion
of Attorney-Client Privilege to Protect the Client's Identity, 28 U. Cm. L. REV. 533 (1961).
24. For an excellent discussion of the judicial trend away from the general rule in the
context of tax investigations see Lofts, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Federal Tax
Investigations, 19 TAx L. REV. 405 (1964).
25. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 503-31 (1975).
26. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
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tax payments for prior years, acted upon the advice of a tax attorney
consulted by the client's attorney. Without disclosing the client's identity,
the tax attorney transacted the payment to the Internal Revenue Service.
The Ninth Circuit subscribed to Wigmore's admonition that "much ought
to depend upon the circumstances of each case"" in holding that disclosing
the client's identity would be tantamount to the disclosure of the client's
ultimate motive in seeking legal advice." Although the holding was based
on state precedent,U the principles expounded in Baird have been followed
in federal courts.n
In NLRB v. Harvey,3' the Fourth Circuit held that the identity of the
client need not be disclosed since it was evident that a confidential communication would be disclosed by revealing his name. There, upon identification of the client, it would have been known that the client wanted
information about a representative of the United Mine Workers who was
put under surveillance by private detectives hired by the attorney. The
Fourth Circuit was not only reaffirming the exception relied upon in Baird,
but refining it another degree as it stated quite succinctly the foundation
upon which the exception may be predicated.
The privilege may be recognized when so much of actual communication
has already been disclosed that identification of the client amounts to
disclosure of a confidential communication. 2
33
The Fifth Circuit, in In re GrandJury Proceedings,
held that the exception to the general rule shall be applied when, in the totality of the circumstances, such protection is necessary to preserve the privileged motive.
Prior to In re GrandJury Proceedings, the exception announced in Baird
had never been expressly ruled upon in the Fifth Circuit. However, it had
been recognized by way of dicta.3 4 The court was particularly impressed
with the analysis demonstrated in Baird, and focused on that court's rationale regarding the relevancy of what has already been disclosed. This
test of "logical relevance and probative value ' 35 in conjunction with the
facts of each case was very persuasive and appealing to the Fifth Circuit.
The court stated: "The exception announced in Baird, where applicable,
is as much a part of this circuit's federal law of evidence as is the normal
rule of no privilege." The court further noted that to disclose the clients'

27. 8 WIGMoas, EvIDEN E §2313, at 608 (McNaughton, 1961).
28. 279 F.2d at 630.
29. See Ex Parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 P. 566 (1915).
30. See, e.g., Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F. 2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Harvey, 349
F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965).
31. 349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965).
32. Id. at 905.
33. 517 F.2d 666, 674-76 (5th Cir. 1975).
34. See American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 1971).
35. 517 F.2d at 672.
36. Id. at 671.
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identities would corroborate already existent incriminating information
about certain persons suspected of income tax offenses. 7 The court reasoned that this circumstance demonstrated a privileged motive giving rise
to the protection of their identities, ostensibly basing its rationale on the
possible inculpatory effect of the disclosure upon the clients, rather than
focusing its attention upon policy considerations.
The Fifth Circuit, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, reached the correct
result, but through questionable analysis. In upholding the privilege, the
court succeeded in further delimiting, if not implicity overruling, the Pape
decision. The court, however, opted to analyze the facts solely in light of
Baird and cases following its precedent, without ever addressing itself
to, or in any way distinguishing, its facts vis-a-vis Pape. In Pape, the
attorney was forced to disclose that the defendant retained him on behalf
of a prostitute. This incriminated the defendant by connecting him to the
woman, and thereby sealed his conviction under the White Slave Traffic
Act.3" Similarly in In re Grand Jury Proceedings,the attorney's compelled
disclosure regarding their clients' identities would have incriminated their
clients in connection with their payment of fees on behalf of third parties,
which the I.R.S. believed to be in excess of their reported income. The
attorneys in both cases rendered professional services based on frank, confidential communications. In both cases, disclosure of the sought after
information, the client's identity, would result in the incrimination of the
client." In Baird, a persuasive and highly regarded decision, the rationale
focused upon not the policy aspects, which are the foundation of the privilege, but upon the motives of the client in seeking professional advice - two
closely related, yet independent considerations. The ultimate motive in
seeking legal advice was clearly based on the client's desire to vindicate
himself from possible prosecution by the I.R.S. Conversely, in In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, the determination of the ultimate motive for retaining
counsel, which the court heavily stressed by its strict adherence to Baird,
was hampered by the addition of third parties absent in Baird. This fact
arguably makes it increasingly difficult to resolve the ultimate motive
issue, a concern which unfortunately the court failed to address. Indeed,
the rationale of Baird seems questionable when an anonymous client becomes insulated from possible prosecution because his attorney transacts
37.

Id. at 674.

38. 18 U.S.C.A. § 398 (1910), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2421-24 (Rev. 1949). This act
prohibited the transportation of a woman in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution or other immoral purposes.
39. Learned Hand's dissent in Pape reflected new insight in the need for broadening the
heretofore restricted parameters of the attorney-client privilege, and emphasized the manifest
need to analyze carefully the facts before applying the privilege. He felt that retainer was a
communication between attorney and client, a step in his own defense, a privileged communication. 144 F.2d at 783 (Hand, J., dissenting).
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the essentially ministerial function of mailing his overdue payment to the
I.R.S.' 0
The court's treatment of the rationale underlying the privilege is demonstrative of the trend" away from the mechanical application of the general
rule of no privilege as exemplified by Pape. But mere acknowledgement of
the need for a case-by-case methodology before asserting the privilege does
not go far enough. In an area of law where inconsistency and lack of uniformity prevail in the decision making process, the courts must strive to
avoid further confusion by structuring their analysis around the fundamental policies at stake, and in light of the unique fact situations before
them. The fact that the court in In re Grand Jury Proceedings lost sight
of these considerations is evident in their total reliance on Baird. The
decision leaves the lower courts with minimal, if any, guidance for future
cases. An unqualified acceptance of the Baird exception does little to fill
the gaps of uncertainty all too prevalent in the privilege area.
ROBERT

B.

LIPMAN

40. See, e.g., United States v. Brickey, 426 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
828, 91 S.Ct. 55, 27 L.Ed.2d 57 (1970); United States v. Bartone, 400 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1027, 89 S.Ct. 631, 21 L.Ed.2d 571 (1969). In both Brickey and Bartone,
evidence that the attorneys performed only ministerial functions was strong, and evidence of
an attorney-client relationship based on legal advise was weak or nonexistent. Thus, both
attorneys were compelled to testify regarding their clients' tax evasion. See also McCORMICK,
EVIDENCE § 90 at 187 (2d ed. 1972): "In these cases it may well be questioned whether the
attorney was in fact merely purveying anonymity, scarcely a professional legal service."

41. See Comment, Assertion of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Protect the Client's
Identity, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. at 542-43 (1961), wherein it is stated: "The cases collectively
represent a shift in judicial attitude towards protecting the client's identity when under the
same circumstances other communications to an attorney would be protected."

